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ABSTRACT
This article offers an overview of the monetary policy framework review currently being conducted 
by the United States Federal Reserve (Fed). First, we examine the alternative strategies under 
consideration to address the likely greater incidence of episodes in which monetary policy is 
influenced by the existence of an effective lower bound (ELB) to which the policy rate can fall. We 
also discuss how the available empirical evidence drawn from the Fed’s own experience makes it 
likely that it will retain in its toolkit the non-conventional monetary policy instruments adopted in 
the wake of the global financial crisis to tackle the problem of the greater incidence of the ELB: 
namely, quantitative easing and forward guidance. Finally, we analyse possible changes in the 
Fed’s communications policy.
Keywords: monetary policy strategy, quantitative easing, forward guidance, communications 
policy.
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Introduction
In November 2018 the United States Federal Reserve (Fed) announced it would 
conduct, in 2019 and the first half of 2020, a far-reaching review of the monetary 
policy framework it currently has in place to pursue its dual mandate of price stability 
and maximum employment. The review –which follows in the footsteps of other 
central banks1 – seeks to be exhaustive and will cover the three key elements of this 
framework: the flexible inflation targeting strategy2, the instruments available for its 
implementation and communications policy. Conversely, neither the dual mandate, 
imposed by Congress, nor the Fed’s own assessment that an inflation rate of 2% in 
the medium term is the target most consistent with that mandate, i.e. that changes 
in the level of this target would not be envisaged3, are part of the review. 
The main aim of the review is to ensure that monetary policy has sufficient tools to 
guarantee fulfilment of its statutory objectives, in an economic context significantly 
different from that in place before the 2008 global financial crisis. Thus, the decline 
in the natural interest rate observed in the United States and in many developed 
economies in recent decades4 owing to the action of structural factors, such as 
population ageing and the slowdown in productivity, makes it more likely that 
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1   The Bank of Canada, for example, conducts regular reviews of its inflation targeting framework every five 
years.  The  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  carried  out  a  strategy  review  in  2003,  following  five  years’ 
experience further to the introduction of the euro and the common monetary policy, and it has announced 
it will conduct a new review under the mandate of its next president, Christine Lagarde.
2   In January 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) published a strategic document clarifying 
its intention to be balanced in the fulfilment of its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability, 
with the latter specified in the form of an inflation target of 2% per annum.
3   See Powell (2019) and Clarida (2019). 
4   The economic literature defines the natural or neutral interest rate as the real interest rate that would be 
observed  in  an  equilibrium  scenario  in  which  nominal  prices  and  wages  were  perfectly  flexible.  Its 
significance for monetary policy stems from the fact that, when the real  interest rate is above its natural 
level, aggregate demand is insufficient and deflationary pressures are generated (the opposite occurs when 
the real rate stands above the natural rate). This neutral interest rate is not directly observable, but various 
papers have estimated a notable decline in the rate globally, using various approaches. See King and Low 
(2014), Holston et al. (2017), Galesi et al. (2017), Rachel y Smith (2017), Fiorentini et al. (2018) and Brand 
et al. (2018).
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episodes such as those during the crisis will recur. Indeed, the existence of an 
effective lower bound (ELB) to which interest rates can fall restricts, in the event of 
severe shocks, the stabilising capacity that the conventional monetary policy 
instruments can provide. Moreover, the recent flattening of the Phillips curve (i.e. the 
lesser sensitivity of prices to the degree of slack in the economy, something common 
to many of the developed economies5) enables – for given inflation expectations – 
the Fed to address its maximum employment goal without prompting sharp 
adjustments to the inflation rate. In a setting like the present, however, such flattening 
hampers communication of the inflation goal, especially when set against possible 
episodes involving the deanchoring of expectations. 
The review is also an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the innovations 
which, in respect both of the use of non-conventional monetary policy instruments 
and of communication, the Fed and other central banks introduced over the past 
decade, precisely to circumvent the limitations arising from the ELB. Finally, it should 
not be overlooked that, along with structural considerations, there may also be a 
more conjunctural concern. This is, namely, that potential recessionary shocks could 
put an end to the prolonged expansion of the US economy. 
THE THREE PILLARS OF THE REVIEW
Figure 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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5   See Galí and Gambetti (2018) and Blanchard et al. (2015).
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This article looks at the scope of the monetary policy framework review the Fed is 
conducting, and which is summarised in Fig. 1. The second section summarises the 
main monetary policy strategy elements under scrutiny. The third section then 
expands the discussion to the non-conventional instruments adopted following the 
Great Recession, focusing on the quantitative easing policy. Finally, the fourth section 
addresses communications aspects, paying particular attention to forward guidance. 
Possible changes in the monetary policy strategy 
The Fed’s policy interest rate is currently in the range of 1.75%-2% and the medium- 
and long-term projections of the FOMC members place it at around 2.5%, which 
would entail a natural interest rate (discounting the inflation objective) of 0.5%. In the 
current context the Fed lacks the space that has traditionally been needed to cut 
policy rates during recessions, which has been around 5 percentage points 
(Chart 1.1). This structural reduction in the natural interest rate is likely to give rise to 
an increase in the incidence of new ELB episodes such as those experienced in the 
wake of the Great Recession, with a frequency that some papers place at up to 
40%.6 Hence, the assessment under way will analyse – on the basis of alternatives 
raised in the academic literature – possible changes in the current flexible inflation 
targeting strategy.7 The aim will be to make the strategy more robust to the 
proliferation of these episodes, given that the empirical evidence accumulated over 
the past decade suggests that the resort to non-conventional measures may not 
always suffice to overcome the difficulties generated by ELB.8 
Having ruled out the possibility of raising the inflation target9 (which would provide 
for greater room for manoeuvre, but which is considered inconsistent with the price 
stability mandate), discussion focuses on strategic proposals that advocate 
combating severe shocks which might lead to prolonged periods of below-target 
inflation. This can be achieved through maintaining monetary stimuli for longer than 
the return to the target itself would strictly warrant, therefore allowing inflation to 
stand temporarily at levels above targets (makeup strategies).10 
One of the possible strategies under which that principle holds is that of price-level 
targeting (PLT).11 Under this type of strategy, a target path for the level of prices would be 
 6   See Kiley and Roberts (2017).
 7   For a recent review of these alternative monetary policy strategies, see Banco de España (2019).
 8   See, for example, Yellen (2016), Reifschneider (2016), Debortoli et al. (2019) and Eberly et al. (2019).
 9   See, for example, Blanchard et al. (2010), Ball (2014) and Krugman (2014).
10   Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
11   Svensson (1999), Gaspar et al. (2007) and Williams (2017). 
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announced, whereby periods of inflation below (above) the rate consistent with the target 
path would be offset afterwards by higher (lower) inflation to return to the announced 
price path (Charts 1.2 and 1.3). In that way, inflation expectations, and thereby real interest 
rates, would adjust, thus contributing to maintaining the desired monetary policy stance. 
However, a PLT strategy would pose significant communication challenges, as it 
would mark a far-reaching change in the Fed’s framework for action. This is so 
The decline in the natural interest rate has reduced the monetary policy room for manoeuvre to stabilise the economy, in the event of severe 
recessionary shocks, using conventional instruments. The Fed is analysing possible changes to its current monetary policy strategy with the 
aim of making it more robust to the problems an effective lower bound (ELB) poses to reductions in the short-term rates it directly controls.
MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES IN A LOW INTEREST RATE ENVIRONMENT
Chart 1
SOURCE: Own data, drawing on Federal Reserve and Goldman Sachs.
a Maximum 10-year bond rate in the six months prior to the first interest rate cut minus the minimum 10-year bond rate reach before the 
first interest rate rise.
b Bernanke et al. (2019).
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because its stabilisation properties depend crucially on the credibility of the strategy 
and, therefore, on agents understanding it and incorporating it into their expectations-
formation processes. Accordingly, some proposals consider a less abrupt change in 
the current inflation targeting strategy, replacing its formulation in terms of an annual 
inflation rate with an average calculated for a period spanning several years (AIT)12, 
which would largely enable the stabilisation properties of the PLT strategy to be 
reproduced. One problem not resolved by either of these two alternatives, however, 
is the monetary policy response to adverse supply-side shocks (an increase in 
energy prices or in VAT, for instance), which contract activity and cause, at the same 
time, a temporary increase in inflation. Under both strategies, the higher inflation 
must be offset with lower inflation in the future, in an adverse setting for activity, 
giving rise to severe problems of time consistency, since doubts could be raised 
over the central bank’s commitment to tightening the monetary policy stance in a 
recessionary environment. One alternative, proposed by Bernanke13, would involve 
setting an average inflation price level target only during the ELB episode and until 
average inflation returns to target, i.e. temporary price-level targeting (TPLT). 
Quantitative analyses performed with dynamic general equilibrium models confirm 
the theoretical benefits of strategies that introduce the above-mentioned stabilisation 
properties, in particular when facing ELB periods, whose frequency and duration 
would be reduced, as would the associated activity and inflation-related losses14 
(see in Chart 1.4 the comparison of TPLT strategies with the loss of inflation under a 
conventional Taylor rule). However, the lack of experience with the former makes 
them vulnerable, in practice, to calibration problems, especially if agents form their 
expectations adaptively or if the central bank’s credibility is imperfect, which might 
prompt an excessive increase in inflation and risks to financial stability.15 One 
possible solution to mitigate the excessive increase in inflation would be to restrict 
the low-inflation period that would have to be offset, whereby the average inflation 
to be taken into consideration would be calculated over a maximum of 1-3 years, for 
example. As Bernanke et al. (2019) show, that would preclude an excessive increase 
in inflation, even if agents were to have adaptive expectations or the central bank’s 
credibility were imperfect (e.g. the scenario described in Chart 1.4 restricts the years 
over which the inflation average is calculated, namely TPLT for one year, which helps 
contain the rise in inflation in the medium term).  
In short, the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of the possible change in 
strategy remains open. The question posed is whether it is possible to obtain similar 
results within the current flexible inflation targeting framework that has been used to 
12   Nessén and Vestin (2005).
13   See Bernanke (2017), Bernanke et al. (2019), Williams (2018) and Mertens and Williams (2019).
14   Hebden and López-Salido (2018), Banco de España (2019), Bernanke et al. (2019) and Svensson (2019).
15   See, for example, Brainard (2017) and Kashyap and Siegert (2019).
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date. The decision ultimately adopted will also be affected by the considerations 
made regarding the implementation and communication of the Fed’s monetary 
policy in the future. We address these aspects below. 
Review of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy instruments 
Following the Great Recession, many central banks adopted non-conventional 
measures to alleviate the constraint posed by ELB. In the case of the Fed, two main 
instruments were used: forward guidance about the future course of monetary 
policy, and large-scale asset purchase programmes (quantitative easing). Both 
instruments act on medium and long-term interest rates, to hold them at moderate 
levels, although they do so through different mechanisms. Forward guidance policies 
steer economic agents’ expectations about the course of short-term interest rates 
under the central bank’s direct control. Quantitative easing, by contrast, acts by 
reducing the risk premia on the assets acquired (and their close substitutes). 
Analysis of the empirical evidence built up drawing on the Fed’s experience suggests 
that the resort to non-conventional measures provided for a softening – though not 
complete avoidance – of the ELB constraint, with significant effects on long-term 
interest rates, inflation and growth.16 Foreseeably, then, the ongoing review of the 
monetary policy framework will suggest retaining these instruments in the Fed’s toolkit 
in order to counter severe recessionary shocks. The assessment will also look at the 
experience of other central banks with alternative non-conventional instruments. These 
include most notably negative interest rates (used in European countries, at the ECB, 
and in Japan) and Yield Curve Control (YCC), practised in Japan since 2016. To date, 
the Fed has been sceptical about innovations along these lines, in particular in relation 
to negative rates. This is because of the destabilising effect they might have on the 
investment fund industry, which plays a key role in the US financial system. For its part, 
the Japanese experience of direct control of long-term interest rates would appear 
difficult to extrapolate to more liquid and deeper markets, such as the US government 
debt markets, in which the implementation of this type of measure might require very 
high volumes of government debt purchases and sales by the central bank.
The quantitative easing policy adopted after the Great Recession also meant an 
unprecedented increase in the Fed’s balance sheet (Chart 2) and a substantial rise 
in the banking system’s reserves. This involved a change in the arrangements used 
to control interbank market interest rates: namely, from a corridor system, depending 
on frequent open market operations, to a floor system, which takes as a reference 
16   Bernanke (2017), Eberly et al. (2019) and Bhattarai and Neely (2016) summarise the abundant literature 
on this issue. Sims and Wu (2019) study, in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model, the use 
of non-conventional monetary policy instruments and the interaction between them. 
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the interest rate remunerating banks’ reserve holdings.17 In this respect, the 
assessment addresses the optimal size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet 
in the medium and long term. The balance sheet should in any case be bigger than 
before the crisis to accommodate the trend growth of liabilities other than reserves, 
such as cash in circulation18, and a higher demand for reserves owing to the 
regulatory changes in recent years, which require financial institutions to pay greater 
attention to the management of liquidity risks. Moreover, the Fed announced in early 
2019 that it will continue operating the current floor system, based on an abundant 
volume of reserves19, which has provided for an effective transmission of monetary 
policy signals. As to balance sheet composition, the Fed has shown a clear preference 
for maintaining a portfolio mainly comprised of domestic government debt securities, 
although there are various different opinions20 about its composition by maturity. 
In response to the global financial crisis, the Fed adopted forward guidance and quantitative easing measures with the aim of softening the 
ELB constraint. The Fed will, moreover, analyse the international experience with the use of alternative non-conventional instruments.
NON-CONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Chart 2
SOURCE: Own calculations based on the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Congressional Budget Office.
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17   See, for example, Arce et al. (2019).
18   Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Report, February 2019.
19   See the “Statement regarding monetary policy implementation and balance sheet normalization” by the 
Federal Reserve, 30 January 2019. To accommodate the fluctuations in banks’ demand for liquidity, which 
prompted a rise in repo rates in September, without harming the current floor system of monetary policy 
implementation, the FOMC decided in mid-October to purchase US Treasury bills, at least until June 2020 
(for an initial volume of $60 billion per month), and to conduct overnight and term repo operations, at least 
until January 2020, to maintain a sufficient volume of reserves in the system. 
20   See the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of 30 April and 1 May 2019.
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Review of the Federal Reserve’s communications policy 
In recent decades, the Fed’s communications policy has undergone far-reaching 
changes that have distanced it from the opaqueness of earlier times. The rapid 
downturn in the economic situation following the global financial crisis soon made it 
clear that the effectiveness of the monetary policy response hinged crucially on 
households’ and firms’ long-term inflation expectations remaining anchored at 
target-compatible levels. The effective communication of the FOMC members’ 
assessment of the economic outlook, of the desired monetary policy stance and of 
how this stance would vary with changing circumstances (the reaction function) is 
crucial for dispelling possible doubts about the central bank’s commitment to its 
medium-term objectives. 
Against this background, the Fed has in recent years made numerous innovative 
changes to its communications policy (Table 1). Back in 2007 it published for the first 
time the range and central tendency of the FOMC members’ quarterly inflation and 
unemployment projections (SEP). This information has been expanded in successive 
steps: in 2009, long-term projections for growth, inflation and unemployment were 
added; in 2011, the balance of risks and the level of uncertainty surrounding the 
projections were quantified, with this information further refined in 2017 with the 
publication of fan charts; and in 2012, the individual projections of the Committee 
members on the interest rate path (known as dot plot or, simply, dots) were added. 
KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL RESERVE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, 2007-2019
Table 1
SOURCES: Own data, drawing on Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2019), and Federal Reserve Board.
Date
Nov-2007
Feb-2009
Apr-2011
Nov-2011
Jan-2012
Sep-2014
Sep-2015
Dec-2015 Supplementary note on the implementation of the first rate rise since the crisis.
Jan-2016
Apr-2017
Sep-2017
Jan-2019
Mar-2019 Statement on the normalisation of the bank balance sheet in step with the abundant reserves regime.
Holding of press conferences after every FOMC meeting, instead of once quarterly. Additional statement confirming that the Fed will
continue operating its current abundant reserves regime.
Action
Publication of the first quarterly projections report (SEP) as an annex to the minutes of the FOMC meeting. The range and central
tendency of the FOMC members' individual projections for the three coming years for GDP, inflation and unemployment are included.
Long-term projections are added to the SEP.
Start of quarterly press conferences; SEP publication coincides with the press conferences.
Quantification of the balance of risks and of the level of uncertainty surrounding the projections.
First annual statement on long-term monetary policy objectives and strategy. The FOMC specifies the inflation target numerically at 
2%. The FOMC members' individual projections on the interest rate path (dot plot) are added to the SEP.
Statement on Federal funds interest rate and bank balance sheet normalisation principles and plans.
Annex to the normalisation plans and principles.
The median of the individual projections is added to the SEP.
The FOMC clarifies that the inflation target is "symmetrical".
Publication of fan charts, which show the forecasting error around the median.
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These projections are watched very closely by analysts, seeking significant 
information on the future monetary policy stance. However, the fact that market 
expectations habitually differ significantly from the median of the projections shows 
that it is not possible to interpret the latter as an FOMC consensus indicator and that 
there is room for improvement in the communication of the Committee’s reaction 
function.21 Lastly, other far-reaching innovations in communication include: the 
holding since 2011 of press conferences after FOMC meetings; the publication since 
2012 of an annual declaration of long-term monetary policy objectives and strategy; 
and the clarification in 2016 that the Fed would react equally to positive and negative 
deviations from the 2% inflation target, thereby emphasising its symmetrical nature.22 
The Fed’s experience using forward guidance, which it took up again in the crisis 
after having introduced it for the first time in 2003, also shows the importance of 
flexible communication. Initially, guidance was merely qualitative, along the lines of 
“The Fed will keep the federal funds rate exceptionally low for some time”. However, 
when it was perceived in 2011 that the lack of specificity of this policy limited its 
effectiveness, the FOMC began to make the period over which rates would remain 
close to zero explicit (what is known as time-dependent guidance). Subsequently, in 
late 2012, possible changes in policy interest rates were linked to how economic 
circumstances were (state-dependent guidance), with guidance as to how rates 
would hold close to zero while the unemployment rate was “above 6.5%”, and 
provided that inflation behaved soundly. Thereafter, guidance moved in step with the 
pick-up in the US economy, resuming more qualitative formulations in 2014. In 
January 2019, economic conditions and the uncertainty over the economic outlook 
advised not including specific forward guidance in statements made after FOMC 
meetings, stressing simply that future decisions would depend on economic data.23 
In contrast, the Fed has continued offering guidance on its balance sheet 
normalisation plans and has stated its intention to carry on operating under an 
excess reserves regime. 
The ongoing review will, in the communications area, allow for analysis of the 
effectiveness of the innovations made in recent years. Many of them, as in the case 
of other central banks, were geared to increasing transparency and minimising the 
uncertainty associated with monetary policy, thus contributing to lessening inflation 
volatility. The search for greater clarity should not be at odds with a more flexible use 
of communication. The recent experience with forward guidance illustrates that 
21   One possible solution would be for the FOMC to publish a consensus projection of the interest rate path, 
as,  for  instance,  the  Riksbank  does;  however,  the  greater  size  of  the  Committee  hampers  this  task. 
Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2019) consider the possibility of  jointly publishing the macroeconomic and 
individual interest rate projections of the FOMC members, observing anonymity, which would help markets 
to better infer the reaction function. 
22   See  Evans (2017) and Yellen (2017).
23   See, for example, Clarida (2018).
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communication that is adapted to changing circumstances is preferable to 
excessively rigid formulas. The review should also serve other purposes: first, to 
identify areas for improvement, making communication more amenable to the public 
in general; and further, to clarify those aspects that have proven more difficult to 
understand, such as the nature of the FOMC members’ interest rate projections and 
how to have these projections provide for a better understanding of the central 
bank’s reaction function.24
28.10.2019.
24   See  the  minutes  of  the  FOMC  meeting  of  29-30  January  2019,  Powell  (2019)  and  Cecchetti  and 
Schoenholtz (2019).
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